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Abstract 
The Deacons for Defense and Justice—specifically the Bogalusa, Louisiana 
chapter—made a lasting impression on the debate between nonviolence and self-defense in 
the American civil rights movement. With an awareness of the influence of media, especially 
in regard to its coverage of the tense social atmosphere of the 1960s, the Deacons 
successfully implemented and justified the practice of self-defense with guns. During the 
summer of 1965, the city of Bogalusa witnessed the eruption of a chaotic racial situation that 
had been developing for decades. Mass attention, ranging from that of civil rights activists to 
media journalists, centered on the city as local and regional whites clashed with Bogalusa’s 
black community. The Deacons challenged the effectiveness of nonviolent activism through 
their application of self-defense to bolster this disadvantaged populace. Despite its sole aim 
to protect the black population, the Bogalusa chapter of the Deacons found itself invigorating 
the broader civil rights movement and successfully navigating the media landscape.  
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The Activist-Media Exchange in the American Civil Rights Movement: An Introduction 
National and local news played a prominent yet complicated role in the American 
civil rights movement. This media had countless implications for the movement—both 
progressive and regressive in nature. The persistence of media coverage equipped civil rights 
leaders and activists with consistent publicity. This attention demanded their participation in 
a largely unfamiliar societal arena. Regardless of the intention and accompanying perspective 
of media coverage, a nationwide reliance on news permitted widespread and intimate 
engagement with the movement. The movement’s participants confronted a reality 
exemplary of the fight or flight dilemma as the opportunity for media attention materialized. 
Activists could either act presentably to an increasingly national audience, or disregard such 
implications of “acceptance” to retain allegiance to their respective ideals. The realization of 
these approaches admittedly reflected much more multifaceted interaction with and reaction 
to not only the media, but also American society as a whole. Regardless of mutual success or 
failure, the routine struggle between activists and media personnel to maintain authority on a 
presumed nationally honored high ground revealed a deeply-rooted tension.   
The nature of the relationship between those within the media and the movement 
ranged from hospitable and affirming to harsh and dismissive, as clarified by the evolution in 
perception of the media’s role by both activists and media personnel in subsequent decades. 
For example, while participating in the conference “Covering the South: A National 
Symposium on the Media and the Civil Rights Movement,” Representative John Lewis, who 
played a crucial leadership and activist role during the movement, admitted that “The civil 
rights movement would have been like a bird without wings if it hadn’t been for the news 
 Streets 3 
media.”1 On the other hand, Enterprise-Journal editor Charles Dunagin recognized the lack of 
correspondence between the movement and the media, reflecting that “the biggest failure of 
the Mississippi press during the civil rights struggle was in not getting the ‘behind-the-
scenes’ story.”2 This “behind-the-scenes” narrative reflected the humanity, and in turn, 
morality that consistently defined the movement. The media conversely satisfied and repelled 
the activists who served as their subjects by misrepresenting this reality. 
Strategic self-analysis was vital to the success of those engaged in the fight for 
equality due to the complexities of the communication between the movement and its 
contemporary examination by the media. The civil rights movement required consideration 
and contemplation by all who interacted with the media, but participants within the localized 
realm had to overcome the burden of not only being misinterpreted, but also overlooked. The 
adoption of nonviolent protest as the key to the achievement of equal rights emboldened the 
movement’s internal and national frames of support and strained the acceptance and success 
of other approaches to protest and activism. Through its depictions in and engagement with 
national media, the Bogalusa chapter of the Deacons for Defense and Justice successfully 
maintained its presence as a self-defense entity while also influencing local and national 
debate on the preferred method of successful protest. 
The Interplay between Self-Defense and Nonviolent Protest: An Examination 
There was constant communication between the different methods of activism and 
protest throughout the civil rights movement. The shift by the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) from the promotion of 
 
1 David Treadwell, “Journalists Discuss Coverage of Movement: Media Role in Civil Rights Era Reviewed,” 
Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1987.  
2 Treadwell, “Journalists Discuss.” 
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nonviolent passive resistance to the endorsement of armed self-defense “as a legitimate and 
viable tactic in the struggle to achieve civil and human rights” reflected the significance of 
this exchange.3 Martin Luther King, Jr. maintained the moral and practical value of 
nonviolent activism. However, the promotion of a need for change in approach by the 
movement reached a growing number of those affected by the racial status-quo. The 
persistence of racial inequality and injustice inspired increased examination of the 
effectiveness of nonviolence even as the national movement maintained allegiance to the 
practice. Dissatisfaction within southern black communities, and specifically that in 
Bogalusa, Louisiana, consistently erupted due to racial biases in local, regional, and state 
police forces and “major public and private sectors.”4 Similarly, the presence of the Ku Klux 
Klan and other white supremacist organizations reminded the black population of the racial 
reality of the South. For example, in his recounting of the Bogalusa experience, Ivory Perry, 
a black activist with decades of field experience, recalled that “On more than one occasion 
automobiles with one high-beam headlight, purportedly a secret sign of the Ku Klux Klan, 
forced him off the road.”5 While there were instances of prominent self-defense efforts in the 
first half of the 1960s, such as that of Robert F. Williams’ NAACP chapter in Monroe, North 
Carolina, self-defense remained a subsidiary within the arena of activism.  
The early dismissal of self-defense largely resulted from the fear that “the use of force 
by Black people and the movement would only serve to alienate White liberal and the 
general White population.”6 Proclamations for the fulfillment of unconditional 
 
3 Akinyele O. Umoja, “The Ballot and the Bullet: A Comparative Analysis of Armed Resistance in the Civil 
Rights Movement,” Journal of Black Studies 29, no. 4 (1999): 558, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645870. 
4 Rickey Hill, “The Bogalusa Movement: Self-Defense and Black Power in the Civil Rights Struggle,” The 
Black Scholar 41, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 50, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5816/blackscholar.41.3.0043. 
5 George Lipsitz, “Bogalusa: Civil Rights in a Southern City,” in A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the 
Culture of Opposition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 94. 
6 Umoja, “The Ballot and the Bullet,” 561. 
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nonviolence—such as the Southern Leadership Conference’s declaration that “Even in the 
face of death, not one hair of one head of one white person shall be harmed”—served as 
assurances of the existence of a tolerable and nationally agreeable approach to the attainment 
of equality.7 Such sentiments proved satisfactory for the national audience while those 
actively engaged in the South experienced their baselessness first-hand. As clarified by 
CORE’s Richard Haley, “this nonviolent strategy had been effective in focusing national 
attention on the South and winning ‘sympathetic public opinion’ in the North, but northern 
sympathy was slow to translate into protection.”8 Organizations, including SNCC and CORE, 
turned to more forceful forms of engagement in the South as the southern reality remained 
largely unchanged despite the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They retained faith 
in their field work practices, but promoted protective services in order to fully excel in their 
efforts.  
While organizations involved in the South—specifically SNCC and CORE—had 
drifted toward armed resistance and defense throughout the first half of the 1960s, they 
widely accepted the approach by 1965. Although some members had always carried guns, 
the organizations recognized the need for all-encompassing forms of protection. In his work 
This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed, Charles E. Cobb recognized the dilemma of complete 
nonviolence, writing, “Few had any training in nonviolence beyond a few workshops to 
prepare them to sit in or walk picket lines. Even fewer had any grounding in nonviolence as a 
philosophy or way of life.”9 Nonviolent activism may have been the customary approach, but 
 
7 Umoja, “The Ballot and the Bullet.” 
8 Lance E. Hill, The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 133. 
9 Charles E. Cobb Jr., This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed: How Guns Made the Civil Rights Movement 
Possible (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 93.  
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its success depended on unrealistic circumstances. Civil rights activists either personally 
carried guns or accepted the protective services of others as a result of this shift in mindset. 
On the national stage, leaders such as Malcolm X proclaimed self-defense as the future of the 
movement. The attachment of these often controversial leaders, such as Malcolm X and 
North Carolina’s Robert Williams, to self-defense added complicated implications to the 
proposition of guns in the movement. However, their justifications for self-defense mirrored 
the sentiments and experiences in the South, as seen in Malcolm X’s remark that “It is 
criminal to teach a man not to defend himself when he is the constant victim of brutal attacks. 
It is legal and lawful to own a shotgun or a rifle. We believe in obeying the law.”10  
Malcolm X increasingly associated himself with the brand of self-defense previously 
maintained by Williams. They believed that the incorporation of guns was secondary to the 
insurance of safety. Although guns may have been required to achieve and preserve 
protection, their use was never an attempt to overwhelm the movement’s moral core. While 
this allegiance inevitably suffered from intentional and inadvertent misinterpretation by both 
supporters and those in opposition within the movement, media, and broader public, the early 
positioning of self-defense received tentative respect by actors situated firmly in the 
nonviolent camp. This underlying relationship, which was rarely acknowledged by the media 
and general populace, reflected a shared history in the tradition of activism. While Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s faith in nonviolence was widely considered and advertised as the core of 
his identity, his beliefs were the result of years of experience with and without the presence 
of guns. For example, during the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1956, King had a gun and 
 
10 M.S. Handler, “Malcolm X Sees Rise in Violence: Says Negroes Are Ready to Act in Self-Defense,” New 
York Times, March 13, 1964, 20.  
 Streets 7 
allowed an armed group to protect his parsonage.11 Despite the often justifiable classification 
of King and Malcolm X’s relationship as adversarial, the two leaders increasingly found 
common ground following Malcolm X’s departure from the Nation of Islam. In fact, his 
dissolution from Elijah Muhammad reflected the dismissal of overt violence. The true nature 
of these relationships and the accompanying exchange in beliefs ultimately became obscured 
as a result of the aforementioned failure by the media to maintain comprehensive coverage.  
Regardless of the supposed character of these leaders, their arguments provided a 
solution to the uphill battle presented in personal testimonies and national reports on the 
South’s situation. Many leaders of this developing shift in approach acknowledged the value 
of nonviolent civil rights efforts in the South, but considered presumedly nonviolent acts as 
symbolic rather than transformative in nature. For example, following his split with Elijah 
Muhammad in March 1964 , Malcolm X emphasized the need for reformed protest methods 
in the South, stating, “Good education, housing and jobs are imperatives for the Negroes, and 
I shall support them in their fight to win these objectives, but I shall tell the Negroes that 
while these are necessary, they cannot solve the main Negro problem.”12 Blacks could often 
attain significant yet surface-level change with the traditional strategy of nonviolent protest. 
However, the establishment of equality required more commanding action. Malcolm X, with 
the freedom to act without restraints charged by Muhammad, pronounced his intention to 
travel south and correct the misguided administration of civil rights activism. He clarified his 
goals for this undertaking and vowed to “join in the fight wherever Negroes ask for my 
 
11 Christopher B. Strain, “The Ballot and the Bullet: Rethinking the Violent/Nonviolent Dichotomy,” in 
Understanding and Teaching the Civil Rights Movement (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019), 87. 
12 M.S. Handler, “Malcolm X Splits with Muhammad: Suspended Muslim Leader Plans Black Nationalist 
Political Movement,” New York Times, March 9, 1964, 1.  
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help.”13 Malcolm X would not enforce specific ideals or convictions, but instead serve to 
embolden those activists desirous of concrete and irreversible racial advancement. Malcolm 
X’s immediate shift to the South following his separation from Elijah Muhammad reflected 
the region’s increasingly tumultuous and multifaceted nature of struggle and resistance. 
News coverage of Malcolm X’s departure from the Nation of Islam highlighted his 
shift to the South and analyzed possible implications of this venture. In his New York Times 
article “Negroes Ponder Malcolm’s Move,” Fred Powledge considered the developing 
discussion on Malcolm X’s arrival in the South, writing that while some civil rights leaders 
believed he would be warmly received, others found his popularity dependent on his 
presence in “the white man’s newspapers and television networks.”14 Similarly, his 
introduction into the South encouraged varying predictions of the future of conflict and 
success in the fight for racial equality. According to civil rights leaders, the recent lack of 
significant progress in the movement dissatisfied many blacks. This stagnation resulted in 
growing intrigue with Malcolm X’s approach. Activist Bayard Rustin acknowledged this 
body of support, remarking that while many of Malcolm X’s proposals for structural equality 
remained too radical, blacks identified with his “analysis of the evils that are being practiced 
on the Negro people.”15 Malcolm X’s proclaimed mission to aid southern efforts sparked 
excitement among media, principals of the civil rights movement, and the broader southern 
populace. This breadth of interest revealed the active and complex interplay of self-defense 
and nonviolent activism.  
 
13 Handler, “Malcolm X Splits,” 42. 
14 Fred Powledge, “Negroes Ponder Malcolm’s Move: Differ Over Significance of His Political Effort,” New 
York Times, March 15, 1964, 46. 
15 Powledge, “Negroes Ponder.”  
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The presumed ineffectiveness of nonviolent efforts compared to the practice 
promoted by Malcolm X led southern blacks to increasingly consider self-defense as a 
necessary tool to attain genuine equality. This demographic had faced an unequal playing 
ground for decades; the continued lack of progress translated into a seemingly inescapable 
burden of injustice. Confrontation of the South’s racial reality needed to be direct and 
incontestable due to the ineffectiveness of nonviolence when acting against such a structure 
of discrimination. When reflecting on his hesitation for nonviolence, Charles “Chuck” 
McDew, who served as the chairman of SNCC from 1960 to 1963, remarked, “when Gandhi 
used [nonviolence] in India, the tactic of having people lay down on railroad tracks to 
protest… it worked… But if a group of black people lay down on railroad tracks here, in 
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, any of these Southern 
states, a train would run you over and back up to make certain you’re dead.”16 As 
exemplified by McDew’s blunt counter to nonviolence, opposition to protest efforts often 
translated into an intensification of injustice and violence. The viability of self-defense 
strengthened as growing numbers of southern blacks and activists identified with McDew’s 
sentiments.  
Support for the shifting analysis of the validity of nonviolent protest and the 
accompanying promotion of self-defense fluctuated within the movement and the nation at 
large. The excitement sparked by such activity invigorated coverage by national media on the 
movement, leading to the designation of nontraditional activists as instigators and dependents 
of media attention. For example, as mentioned earlier, some civil rights leaders believed that 
Malcolm X’s forthcoming possible success in the South would rely on his coverage by “the 
 
16 Charles F. McDew, interview by Joseph Mosnier, Civil Rights History Project, Library of Congress, 2011. 
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white man’s newspapers and television networks.”17 The numerous facets and complexities 
of self-defense remained overlooked and simplified as a result of both the national intrigue 
for the practice and the accompanying speculation of its presence in the media. This 
superficial summation of self-defense resulted in an omittance of the underlying retainment 
of nonviolent tradition held by many activists working under the self-defense umbrella.  
During its early years of implementation, self-defense, and specifically that practiced 
with guns, acted alongside the nonviolent approach. As previously noted, Martin Luther King 
Jr., himself, owned a gun during the early stages of his civil rights career. Similarly, 
prominent promoters of gun use, such as Malcolm X and Robert Williams, acknowledged the 
importance of nonviolence at some point in their careers. This shared affirmation by activist 
groups predominately practicing either self-defense or nonviolence often disappeared under 
the media’s speculative eye. Thus, the maintenance of the bond between self-defense and 
nonviolence depended on commentary by the practitioners themselves. This assignment 
pulled self-defense activists outside of their sphere of action and into the broader situation in 
the South. Localized efforts shifted to region-wide exchange, and community-based groups 
witnessed an introduction of more developed organizations conducive to national attention. 
Their growing engagement with the media often complicated efforts within the movement. 
Despite this development, self-defense activists maintained their sole intention to serve and 
advance the black community.  
In many ways, the national perception of these actors directly conflicted with the 
mission of self-defense. Success in the promotion and implementation of self-defense 
depended on the method’s viability as an instrument to advance the civil rights movement. 
 
17 Powledge, “Negroes Ponder.” 
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On the other hand, the media’s service to its audience required interpretation and coverage 
that replaced the authority of self-defense as a necessary and appropriate practice with the 
glorification of guns and violence. Rather than drawing the vital distinction between the 
mission of self-defense and the function of guns, the media presented the two subjects as 
synonymous and dependent on one another. National media largely dismissed the South’s 
reality of poverty and struggle resulting from racial segregation and discrimination in favor 
of the debate between and accompanying pursuit of self-defense and nonviolence. The 
probability of violence and conflict when practicing self-defense primed the approach for 
national attention. This allure moved activists to strategically position themselves as 
protectors of southern communities and their overlooked black populations. Subsequent 
reproach by the media in response to this intentional presentation lacked legitimacy, as 
activists practiced what they preached. Growing acceptance and implementation of self-
defense required increased consideration and strategy by its practitioners. Without such 
focus, the validity of self-defense within the broader civil rights movement would have 
diminished.  
The Rise of the Deacons for Defense and Justice  
The shift towards the self-defense approach by organizations engaged in the South 
paralleled the surge in national pronouncements for reformed action. As field-workers 
embraced this change, additional organizations either developed or intensified their efforts. 
For example, CORE’s warming up to self-defense coincided with the establishment of the 
Deacons for Defense and Justice in Bogalusa and the two parties soon found support and 
assistance in one another. Following the arrival of CORE director James Farmer in Bogalusa 
in June 1965, detectives warned him of an assassination plot. Farmer refused the detectives’ 
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offer of protective services in favor of support from the Deacons. Following this experience, 
along with various other interactions with the Bogalusa community, Farmer remarked that 
“we have no right to tell Negroes in Bogalusa or anywhere else that they do not have the 
right to defend their homes. It is a constitutional right.”18 As evidenced by this remark, the 
justification for self-defense and the bearing of guns often focused on the approach’s legality. 
Louisiana’s renowned status as the “Sportsman’s Paradise” strengthened the defense for the 
bearing of guns in self-defense.19 Charles Sims acknowledged the paradox between the 
normalcy of guns and resistance to their use in self-defense efforts, explaining that “having a 
weapon’s nothing new. What bugged the people was something else—when they found out 
what was the program of the Deacons.”20  
The Deacons, and more broadly all activists practicing self-defense, struggled to 
maintain a legitimate standing within the civil rights movement due to the misinterpretation 
of gun-use. The presence of guns became synonymous with the provocation of violence 
when in reality, it helped to alleviate the fear prompted by white violence. The national 
media legitimized the misconstrued role of guns through its routine questioning of the morals 
and intentions of activists practicing self-defense. The credibility of self-defense as an 
alternative to nonviolence remained uncertain despite its increased validity. This analysis, 
whether warranted or unjust, resulted from and led to debate within the civil rights 
movement. Nonviolence remained the nationally acceptable method of activism, while self-
defense had supposedly dangerous implications. The rise of the Deacons in Bogalusa 
 
18 Christopher B. Strain, “’We Walked Like Men’: The Deacons for Defense and Justice,” Louisiana History: 
The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 38, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 48, www.jstor.org/stable/4233369. 
19 Strain, “’We Walked Like Men’,” 49. 
20 Ibid. 
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revealed this intricate situation and reflected the successful maintenance and invigoration of 
self-defense as activism and protest. 
Believing that nonviolence had failed to win equal rights and ensure racial justice, the 
Bogalusa chapter organized and promoted itself around the doctrine of self-defense. 
Bogalusa, once referred to as “Klantown USA,” faced a tense and often violent racial 
atmosphere throughout the 1950s and 1960s.21 Bogalusa’s white community persistently 
responded to the country’s gradual adoption of measures of racial equality with social, 
employment, and economic discrimination. The thriving Ku Klux Klan and broader white 
populace (including many of the city’s authorities) thwarted pursuits by both blacks and 
whites to remake Bogalusa. The local Ku Klux Klan, self-titled as the Original Ku Klux Klan 
of Louisiana, emphasized its displeasure with the city’s growing interest in integration in an 
affirmation of the group’s presence in Bogalusa. In response to news of an upcoming 
meeting of integrationists, the organization warned that it “is strongly organized in 
Bogalusa…, [has] members in every conceivable business…, and will know the names of all 
who are invited to the Brooks Hayes meeting.”22 The intentions of this meeting, which was 
set to take place on January 7, 1965, were supposedly to plan “the integration of [the white 
community’s] Church, Schools, Businesses, Restaurants, Hotels, Motels, etc….”23 According 
to the authors of the statement, these acts for integration in Bogalusa would embody visiting 
speaker Brooks Hayes, a “traitor to the South.”24 In reality, Hayes’ meeting, which was 
organized in cooperation with “the federal Community Relations Service,” aimed to provide 
 
21 Hill, The Deacons for Defense, 86.  
22 E. Gerald Pines, “Appendix 3,” in Murky Waters: The Struggle to Integrate Bogalusa Louisiana (Elderberry 
Press, 2004), 66. 
23 Pines, “Appendix 3.”  
24 Ibid.  
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local business owners with “strategies for meeting the public accommodations requirements 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”25 It reflected an attempt to correct long-ignored national 
mandates. This act, along with subsequent attempts to fulfill orders resulting from civil rights 
victories, invigorated the white opposition. In response to growing national criticism and 
rebuke as the fight for equality intensified, Bogalusa’s Ku Klux Klan attacked the media. The 
KKK reported that the author of the particularly critical article “Klan Town U.S.A.,” “which 
accused Bogalusa of being dominated by the Ku Klux Klan,” was a “freelance, alcoholic 
reporter.”26 They further alleged that local reverend, Bruce Shepard, who released an anti-
KKK joint statement with the Hays Committee in the Bogalusa Daily News, “can be 
observed frequently emerging from the Cuban Liquor Company with an arm load of 
liquor.”27 Through their verbal and physical counters to these sources of backlash—such as 
the aforementioned Bogalusa Daily News, which “did not print one single word in the 
defense of Bogalusa” as national media “was tearing Bogalusa into shreds,” and “Black 
Muslems [sic]… who commit murder and commit arson all over the country in a period of 
one week”—the Klan aimed to return the city to its natural order.28 These individuals 
justified their efforts as an attempt to preserve “stability,” but, for them, “stability” meant the 
continuation of white supremacy.  
The forces of white resistance in Bogalusa disregarded federal actions such as 
Executive Order 10925, an attempt to “encourage equal employment opportunities in firms 
with federal contracts,” or the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, which attempted to prohibit de jure 
 
25 Pines, “Appendix 3.”   
26 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations in 
the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 
Eighty-ninth Congress, first[-second] session, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966, 2455. 
27 U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Activities, 2455. 
28 Ibid.  
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segregation.29 Much of the refusal stemmed from Crown Zellerbach, a paper company that 
ruled the town.30 In 1964, Crown Zellerbach “provided 70 percent of Bogalusa’s 
income…with its $19 million payroll, and [its] company-backed candidates dominated local 
politics.”31 Many of the company’s white employees actively participated in the local Ku 
Klux Klan chapter. For these white workers, the company symbolized more than an 
opportunity for employment, it bolstered the argument “that [Bogalusa] has always been a 
Klanish City from the days of the Great Southern Lumber Company until now.”32 Resistance 
to the civil rights struggle only intensified after the mechanization of the paper mill. Between 
1960 and 1965, Crown Zellerbach released five hundred employees, with blacks making up 
three hundred and ninety of those laid off.33 The decrease in employment opportunities at 
Crown Zellerbach heightened competition between white and black workers. This angst often 
bled into everyday life in Bogalusa, exacerbating racial tension. The unequal distribution of 
resources, as presented in “Boglausa: Civil Rights in a Southern City” in George Lipsitz’ 
book A Life in the Struggle: Ivory Perry and the Culture of Opposition, became increasingly 
pronounced and realized within the black community. According to Lipsitz, “the city had no 
black doctors or nurses; the local medical facilities treated black patients only on Thursdays 
and even then only after whites. Tax money for street repairs and sewer construction went 
disproportionately to white neighborhoods… Only 1,500 blacks had succeeded in registering 
to vote in Bogalusa.”34 Despite the supposed racial progress throughout the nation, 
Bogalusa’s black community faced a hapless future.  
 
29 Lipsitz, “Bogalusa,” 98.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
32 U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Activities, 2455. 
33 Owen James Hyman, Corporate Organization and Social Control in the New South: Bogalusa, Louisiana, 
1902-1980 (Hammond: Southeastern Louisiana University, 2012), 65.  
34 Lipsitz, “Bogalusa.” 
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Due to the intensification of white aggression alongside the diminishment in black 
opportunity, local blacks organized the Civic and Voters League in 1965. Bogalusa lacked 
connections to the black church, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), or a black college, and thus, resources for effective and efficient action 
were limited.35 This dearth in community support prompted the Civic and Voters League to 
turn to CORE in order to achieve meaningful progress. CORE’s subsequent arrival in 
Bogalusa led to the heightening of tensions. White violence became routine and quite public, 
placing activists at greater risk. For example, Chief of Police Claxton Knight and Deputy 
Sheriff Doyle Holliday warned CORE organizers Bill Yates and Steve Miller “that a mob of 
two hundred people had gathered downtown with the intention of lynching them.”36 This 
warning was not unique; threats of violence plagued CORE’s stay in Bogalusa. Local 
businesses had to accept the status quo of segregation or face closure.  
Bogalusa began to attract national attention as this situation worsened. College 
students and social activists joined CORE and the Civic and Voters League in the fight. Their 
activism pressured local and state leaders to confront the issue of continued discrimination 
and white supremacy, leading to further division. State officials reluctantly complied with 
some national demands, resulting in backlash at the local level. Authorities still hesitated to 
enforce the law in spite of increased scrutiny and criticism. When recounting an incident of 
harassment by Bogalusa’s whites, Ivory Perry lamented that “city police officers, state 
troopers, and U.S. Department of Justice special representative John Doar” did not try to stop 
the violence.37 National attention on Bogalusa intensified as the situation exacerbated. The 
 
35 Lipsitz, “Bogalusa.” 
36 Ibid., 100.  
37 Ibid., 107.  
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deterioration of Bogalusa’s situation shifted national media coverage from discussion on the 
overall struggle to the burgeoning Deacons for Defense and Justice.  
The Deacons existed only in Jonesboro, Louisiana prior to the establishment of the 
Bogalusa chapter. Like Bogalusa, and much of the South in general, Jonesboro ignored the 
Civil Rights Act. Outside legal action was routinely pursued, but the town’s white population 
actively resisted desegregation through structural maneuvers and violence. The origins of the 
Jonesboro chapter paralleled those of Bogalusa’s Deacons—black men in the community 
were inspired to form a defensive unit following the introduction of nonviolent activism and 
the subsequent white backlash. Local whites purposefully ignored the group despite its 
occasional appearances in national media and acknowledgement by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). For example, in his article for The New York Times, Fred Powledge 
wrote that “Sheriff Newt Loe of Jackson Parish, of which Jonesboro is the seat, declined to 
comment on the Deacons to a reporter.”38 Information about the Deacons largely remained 
underground through this dismissal. Likewise, incidents of harassment and violence in 
response to the presence of the Deacons rarely attracted attention from the national media.  
While Jonesboro’s chapter of the Deacons received minimal attention by the national 
media, Bogalusa’s Deacons quickly emerged in the national spotlight. Although there were 
countless factors involved in this elevated media attention, such as the efforts of CORE, the 
introduction of the FBI, and claims of corruption in Bogalusa, the Deacons consistently 
remained at the center of analysis and debate. Bogalusa’s chapter was formed in the late 
spring and early summer of 1965, and the group was immediately placed at the heart of the 
situation in Bogalusa. Their forceful engagement with white supremacists in defense of the 
 
38 Fred Powledge, "Armed Negroes Make Jonesboro an Unusual Town," New York Times, February 21, 1965, 
52. 
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Civics and Voters League, CORE field workers, and other civil rights activists gave the 
group an authority within the broader civil rights movement. The frankness of their self-
defense approach simultaneously clashed with and aided the nonviolent efforts already 
practiced throughout the South. The Deacons did not shy away from their methods and found 
gratification in the fulfillment of protection through armed defense. Due to the group’s 
promotion of its role as both necessary and justified, it successfully served alongside 
nonviolent efforts rather than in opposition to the more nationally accepted practice. All 
facets of the black community acknowledged the presumedly endless lack of progress, 
allowing for at least minimal communal unification. For example, following a meeting 
between Governor McKeithen and “Negro leaders,” Voters League vice-president Robert 
Hicks bluntly stated that “The governor has no power… All he should do is give everyone 
constitutional rights and he wouldn’t have to call a meeting.” Reflective of the Deacons’ 
defense of their operation with guns, Hicks maintained that “guns are the only protection you 
have if laws are no good” and remarked, “I don’t know if I would be here today unless I had 
a gun.”39 The Deacons translated these personal sentiments—held by community members 
holding varying degrees of influence—into an organized operation. Since the state of 
Louisiana chartered the group “to instruct, train and teach citizens, and especially minority 
groups, in the principles of democracy,” its implementation of self-defense maintained a 
sense of both authority and morality.40 The Deacons served to achieve rightful equality rather 
than to promote unjust acts of violence.  
Along with the group’s self-prescribed purpose, members regarded their motives and 
practices as warranted. The Deacons’ preaching of the necessity of self-defense routinely 
 
39 John Fahey, “Help in Bogalusa, President Asked,” Times-Picayune, July 15, 1965, 2.  
40 Roy Reed, “The Deacons, Too, Ride by Night,” New York Times, August 15, 1965, 11. 
 Streets 19 
challenged the call for nonviolent protest, securing communal support for their approach. 
Individual Deacons found fulfillment in their roles through this praise. For example, Royan 
Burris, a member of the Bogalusa chapter, remarked that “I feel like people look up to you 
for being a deacon. They show a great deal of respect for you, because they know you are the 
one source they can depend on.”41 Such faith in the Deacons was justifiable, as their presence 
reduced “open harassment and night riding” by white supremacists, and specifically the local 
Klan chapter.42 Violence by whites was no longer free from backlash, as seen in this 
recounting: “On July 8, during a civil-rights protest march, a Bogalusa Deacon pulled a pistol 
in broad daylight and put two bullets through a white man who attacked him with his fists.”43 
The direct response by the Deacons gave Bogalusa’s black community a newfound sense of 
security. In an article for The New York Times, Roy Reed reflected that, a few days after an 
instance of successful self-defense, “400 Negroes at a civil-rights mass meeting leaped to 
their feet in a delirious ovation when Charles Sims, the president of the Bogalusa Deacons 
chapter, was introduced.”44 
A Multifaceted yet Deliberate Approach: The Deacons and the Media 
While much of the media’s analysis of the role of Bogalusa’s Deacons in the 
promotion of self-defense was relatively superficial, some examinations went beyond the 
traditional arguments and ventured into the underlying reasons for successful or failed 
protests. For example, in his analysis of the Deacons, Reed related their approach to those of 
other groups in the South. He stated that Floyd McKissick, the national chairman of CORE, 
“told newsmen a few days ago that Negroes band together spontaneously in North Carolina 
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when violence threatens.”45 Reed acknowledged that such impromptu acts of self-defense 
could be successful, but highlighted the chaos surrounding North Carolina’s Robert F. 
Williams as proof of the need for strictly organized action. Reed did not explicitly state that 
the Deacons exemplified the necessary structure, but repeatedly implied it in his numerous 
pieces on the group. The Deacons’ self-defense activism was presented as both responsible 
and acceptable through this commentary.   
The group could justify its acts of self-defense due to this self-proclaimed and 
nationally-acknowledged (at least by some among the media) strict organization. In contrast 
to local white supremacists, who often acted without regard to media coverage, the Deacons 
stated their intentions and fulfilled them responsibly. Their status within the black 
community testified to their success. Reed recognized this prestige, remarking that “the 
Deacons have proved to be a natural instrument for building community feeling and 
nourishing the Negro identity.”46 Much of the Deacons’ success in promoting and practicing 
black community engagement revolved around the fact that many of its leaders and members 
were already actively involved in their community. These men, such as the chapter’s leader 
Charles Sims, embodied the group’s ability to transform men who worked traditional jobs 
and pursued normal lives into meaningful actors within their community. The Deacons 
excited a sense of purpose and stability in response to the decades of insecurity prompted by 
Bogalusa’s allowance of discrimination. The Deacons made available a newfound communal 
respect and identity that allowed Bogalusa’s black community to no longer suffer from 
outside obstruction of opportunity. The seeming naturality of this transformation within the 
black community gave the Deacons a humanity that countered the injustices cast against 
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them. Sims, who worked part-time as an insurance salesman and had a “pre-civil-rights 
police record including such offenses as assault and carrying a concealed weapon,” was now 
a symbol of justice.47 Sims and his peers purposefully presented themselves as normal men 
fighting against years of abuse and disadvantage as the Deacons advanced on the national 
stage.  
The Deacons boldly expressed their confidence in the practice of self-defense in all of 
their interactions with the national media. They frequently made a point of stating their 
bearing and use of guns. For example, Reed reflected that when Sims carried his gun (which 
was all of the time), “If the lump causes him discomfort when he sits down, he simply pulls 
the pistol out and tosses it like a package of cigarettes onto the nearest table.”48 He did this, 
knowing that it had the effect of “unnerving the faint-hearted and enhancing his reputation as 
a hell of a fellow.”49 Sims’ bold self-confidence contrasted with traditional assumptions of 
the status of the black male. Guns had always played a defining role in the culture of the 
South and Sims reminded the national audience that blacks practiced this tradition as strongly 
as their white counterparts. Following centuries of physical and psychological abuse, blacks 
seized the tool with which whites had suppressed them. The Deacons retained notions of 
moral superiority by practicing reactionary self-defense, which in turn elevated their status as 
community leaders and defenders. This identification with both intimidation and virtuous 
protection provided the Deacons with the ability to maneuver inquiry by both the civil rights 
movement and the national media. For example, in an interview with Times-Picayune 
journalist Bill Crider, Charles Sims followed his declaration of the Deacons’ large supply of 
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guns with the clarification that “[the Deacons] will not go on the offense. We are the 
defensive team. If they come in here to hit us they will get hit back.”50 By phrasing his 
response in this way, Sims managed to reiterate that while the Deacons’ practices diverged 
from the nonviolent approach, their implementation of active protest remained disciplined 
and appropriate.  
Nonviolent activism routinely faced indictments of continuing the emasculation of the 
black male. The intentional lack of active response to verbal and physical abuse by whites 
permitted the continuation of centuries-long injustice for many blacks, specifically men, in 
the South. The Deacons openly promoted a bold, gun-yielding, and above all else, masculine 
black male to oppose this dehumanization and emasculation. At the Negro Masonic Hall in 
Jackson, Mississippi, Sims proclaimed, “It is time for you men in Jackson to wake up and be 
men.”51 Royan Burris also acknowledged the relationship between masculinity and self-
defense, stating that “They finally found out that we really are men, and that we would do 
what we said, and that we meant what we said.”52 The media’s coverage of the Deacons, 
which often highlighted the success at maintaining a forceful presence, reinforced these 
proclamations of secured masculinity.  
While this clarification of the Deacons’ interpretation of self-defense often comforted 
black and white activists who felt defenseless against threats of violence, it also called into 
question the group’s motives. Writing for The Wall Street Journal, Fred L. Zimmerman 
expressed concern about the future of nonviolent protest and cast self-defense efforts—
specifically those of the Deacons—as a threat to the civil rights movement. Zimmerman’s 
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use of severe and often frightening language throughout the article reflected his sentiment 
towards the Deacons. For example, he referred to the self-defense groups in the South as 
“bands of militant, heavily armed Negroes…[who] share an open contempt for the doctrine 
of non-violence.”53 In response to the pronouncement by one leader of the Deacons that “If 
the Klan tries to hit us, they will get hit back,” Zimmerman remarked that “There could be 
‘hitting back’ in many a town this summer, for the armed bands are growing rapidly.”54  
Zimmerman acknowledged the presence of the Klan and other white supremacist 
groups in Bogalusa but failed to emphasize their role in the tense racial situation. Instead of 
listing the countless acts of violence and injustice by Bogalusa’s whites, he focused solely on 
the calls for “violence” within the black community. Comments by local blacks, such as, “If 
violence has to settle this, then the sooner the better” were compared to those by Klan 
members.55 Zimmerman presented the Deacons and the KKK as equals in intention and 
action, when in reality, the Deacons served as protection against Klan activity. The presence 
of firearms within Bogalusa’s black community was distorted into a communal infatuation 
with guns. Zimmerman quoted one woman as saying “I’m going to get me a machine gun or 
some hand grenades” and reflected that “Mr. Hicks [the vice president of Bogalusa’s Civic 
and Voter League] hauled out a loaded 30-30 Winchester rifle for the visitors’ inspection.”56 
Zimmerman acknowledged the group’s insistence that it served only to protect and defend, 
but countered by writing, “to Southern law enforcement agencies—and to many groups 
trying to promote integration without violence—these armed bands are essentially vigilantes 
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posing an increasing threat of bloodshed.”57 In essence, Zimmerman positioned the group in 
opposition to all other bodies involved in the civil rights movement.  
While Zimmerman admittedly recognized the arguments in support of and in 
opposition to the Deacons, he ultimately presented the Bogalusa chapter as a threat to 
continued progress. The inclusion of Paul Anthony’s remark that “If the Deacons really catch 
hold, it could mean the end of non-violence in some areas of the South” revealed the extent 
to which the Deacons’ opposition considered their self-defense efforts as a threat.58 Similarly, 
the addition of Ozell Sutton’s accusatory statement that “Someday there’s going to be a real 
bloodbath somewhere. I hate to say it, but by nature Negroes aren’t any more non-violent 
than anybody else” implied that the Deacons’ motives were violent by nature.59 Zimmerman 
intensified the dilemma between nonviolent and self-defense activist efforts through his 
distortion of the Deacons’ approach. Zimmerman simultaneously provided fuel for and 
against the group’s self-promotion as a determined and legitimate force for protection by 
sensationalizing the Deacons and the assumed “controversy” around them. He also misread 
the racial situation throughout the South (and specifically Bogalusa). Without awareness of 
the realities on the ground, Zimmerman badly mispresented the Deacons.  
One method the Deacons used to counter the accusations of Zimmerman and his ilk 
was to present themselves as a uniform and continuously expanding organization. The group 
routinely discussed their presence throughout Louisiana (and more broadly, the South) in 
vague and exaggerated terms and emphasized their implementation of reactive violence 
rather than unwarranted assault. For example, Earnest Thomas, the vice president of the 
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Bogalusa chapter, told Reed that “Many Louisiana parishes (counties) have deacons.”60 Reed 
recollected that “[Thomas] declined to name the towns where the deacons are organized on 
the ground that advertising them might be construed as provoking white extremists.”61 Such 
mystery surrounding the Deacons elevated their standing in the local and national civil rights 
movement, leading to heightened authority as a group. The Bogalusa chapter could not be 
easily dismissed as a band of “militant, heavily armed Negroes,” as they were supposedly 
organized at the local, regional, and national levels of the movement.  
Implications of the Deacons’ Intricate Presentation  
If ambiguity surrounding the magnitude of the Deacons enhanced their mystique, it 
also intensified reluctance within the broader civil rights movement to accept their assistance. 
A 1965 article in the Chicago Daily Defender discussed this rift through an analysis of 
sentiments expressed by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Farmer. While King 
“contends no form of violence can be entertained due to the danger that such action might 
lose many white allies of the movement,” Farmer proclaimed that it was important “to let the 
Klan know that the Negro as whole is not non-violent.”62 The troubling vagueness of the 
classification “self-defense” was clear to King, as he stated, “The line of demarcation 
between aggressive and defensive violence is very thin.”63 The omnipresence of self-defense 
activism could no longer be denied as a result of the establishment of the Bogalusa chapter 
and their subsequent engagement with national media. King recognized this and promptly 
stated his position on the subject. While his perspective reflected the nationally preferred and 
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accepted method of action, the rise of the Deacons helped promote self-defense as an 
alternative.  
It proved an attractive alternative for many as black activism continued to meet with 
violence and intimidation throughout the South. Only fourteen days after the release of his 
expansive overview of the Deacons, “The Deacons, Too, Ride by Night,” Reed wrote a piece 
on the situation in Natchez, Mississippi. Charles Evers, who had previously remarked that 
“he had armed men guarding the homes of Negroes who were threatened,” played a 
significant role in the Natchez situation.64 Although Evers discouraged violence, he 
challenged the continuation of white terrorism, saying, “If they do it any more, we’re going 
to get those responsible. We’re armed, every last one of us, and we are not going to take it.”65 
His boldness and determination paralleled that of the Deacons, and in fact, the group’s 
branches were slowly reaching Natchez. According to James Jackson, “a chapter of the 
Deacons for Defense and Justice was to be organized soon” in the city.66 The enthusiastic 
embrace of the group’s presence throughout the South reflected their successful promotion 
through both local action and engagement with national media.  
Along with its prevalence in prominent national publications, the Bogalusa chapter 
was covered in Jet, a magazine marketed to African-American readers. Jet featured a piece 
on the Deacons’ status in Bogalusa in its July 15, 1965 issue. Charles Sims, the chapter’s 
president, used this opportunity to promote the group’s success. According to Sims, “in a 
time of need he can muster more than 100 armed men in 15 minutes, day or night.”67 
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Although Sims acknowledged that his identifiability was a hindrance to the Deacons’ covert 
approach, he boldly stated that “[whites] know that whenever they see me, the Deacons are 
somewhere nearby.”68 Sims exaggerated the Deacons’ prestige through these claims, which 
in turn heartened local and regional black communities. Sims’ interview with Jet was also a 
strategic move, as the magazine provided its majority black audience with an intimate and 
informative account of the Deacons, and specifically one of its leaders. The interview 
featured personal and race-specific questions, such as, “How does it feel to live 24 hours a 
day in open warfare with a hostile community?”69 Sims’ response that the Deacons were 
unable to get adequate sleep humanized the group. Sims referenced his service in the military 
and the reactionary nature of his self-defense activism to remind Jet’s readers that the 
Deacons had highly skilled and veteran leadership with the sole intention of defending 
against aggression. For example, by reflecting, “I learned a slogan in the Army and I’ve 
always remembered it: ‘All’s fair in love and war.’ When you don’t want me to be free, 
that’s war,” Sims reinforced the Deacons’ credibility as enforcers of justified violence.70 In 
contrast to Zimmerman’s accusations of the Deacons’ desire for militarism, Jet presented the 
group as morally righteous and secure.  
Sims’ discussion with Louis Lomax on a Los Angeles-based “two-hour weekly 
television show” revealed the Deacons’ oftentimes simultaneous failure and success on the 
national stage.71 Sims recognized Lomax’s audience, but did not shy away from his 
transparent position on the merits of guns and self-defense. Regarding his professional dress, 
he stated, “I don’t usually dress like this. I don’t need a tie, and this white shirt makes too 
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good a target at night. Now I wear overalls. They have nice, big pockets so you can carry 
your pipe [gun] and plenty shells.”72 This open deviance from the traditional suavity of the 
civil rights movement deterred many people involved in the fight for equality. For example, 
Reverend Thomas Kilgore, chairman of the Western Christian Leadership Conference, 
remarked, “I disapprove of keeping civil rights workers alive with guns. The non-violent 
approach has brought pressure to bear on those elements which discriminate. The Bogalusa 
movement, under the Deacons—a misnomer—represents a danger to 20 million Negroes.”73 
In contrast to these pronouncements against self-defense, personal testimony by activists 
provided the national media with validation of the group’s necessity and virtue. A white 
woman, Mrs. Anita Levine, recounted her experience as a worker for the Bogalusa Civic and 
Voters League. She argued that without the Deacons, she would have suffered at the hands of 
the Ku Klux Klan. Levine reflected that on one occasion, “The cars kept going up and down 
in front of the church with men inside with drawn guns. I knew they weren’t there to protect 
me….”74 Before the situation worsened, “four Deacons drove up and got into my car…The 
three cars which had been passing immediately sped away.”75 Her mention of the Klan 
emphasized Bogalusa’s reality of seemingly constant violence by whites. Such a revelation 
was significant, as the television show’s audience was largely from Los Angeles, and thus, 
few viewers had personal experience with the South’s racial situation. Following the 
interview, Sims acknowledged the audience’s (and specifically those people with dissenting 
views) separation from the threat of constant racial violence, commenting “I wonder if those 
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men think that I risk losing my life for kicks? Most of the time I sleep—when I sleep at all—
with my shoes on.”76  
The persistent attention placed on the Deacons provided ample opportunity to 
promote their practice of self-defense, but it also revealed fissures in the group. The Deacons 
were controversial, and they inevitably encountered internal and external strife. The July 1, 
1965 issue of Jet provided a brief discussion of the supposedly strained relationship of 
Charles Sims and his wife. According to this short commentary, Sims was giving a televised 
speech when “his alleged common-law wife, 41-year-old Bernice Harry, bolted through a 
door and attacked him with a vengeance only a woman can muster.”77 Jet’s inclusion of such 
a theatrical glimpse into the life of Charles Sims cast the Deacons as less stable than typically 
assumed. Disdain for the group, which had been rooted in their “violent” approach, was 
emboldened by such seemingly embarrassing incidents. Their presumed inability to maintain 
stability in their homes led to questioning of the Deacons’ intentions as an organization.  
 This questioning of the morality of the Deacons often resulted in misleading and 
slanderous classifications of the group. For example, white locals in Bogalusa commented 
that the Deacons were “protection racketeers” and “Mao-inspired nationalists.”78 This 
resistance to the Deacons was largely rooted in the awareness that their organization 
embodied the rise of the powerful and purposeful black male. As one person wrote to the 
editor of Ebony, “This organization in effect explodes the myth of the moral weakness and 
petticoat and pulpit subordination of the Negro male.”79 Considering this transformative 
influence of the Deacons, the group’s defamation by the local and national media 
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simultaneously encouraged its opposition and empowered members of the local, regional, 
and national black communities. One person in Bogalusa acknowledged this effect, stating, 
“Watching the Deacons in Louisiana, one is struck repeatedly by the pride they inspire 
among Negroes…the Deacons have proved to be a natural instrument for building 
community feeling and nourishing the Negro identity.”80  
 The self-prescribed and embraced role of the Deacons reflected this newfound power 
in the black male. They preached their allegiance to the black community over personal 
desires, and their actions almost always echoed this proclamation. Their welcomed 
engagement in the community justified self-defense as a practical form of protest and 
support. In an interview, James Farmer, the national director of CORE, recognized the 
intimacy of this relationship, stating, “You must understand, when a man’s home is attacked 
that’s not the movement, that’s his home.”81 For the Deacons, the movement was not a 
national operation, but instead a deeply personal fight for stability and safety. The seemingly 
slow and meditated action promoted by nonviolent activists was ineffective in countering 
challenges to daily life. Nonviolence required a patience that the Deacons and their 
likeminded neighbors could no longer justify. The often-shared military experience 
(specifically that pertaining to World War II) of community members and leaders allowed for 
direct comparisons between the brutality of war and the situation in Bogalusa. By 
establishing this connection, usually in discussions with members of the media, activists 
opposed to nonviolence credibly promoted more forceful action. Just as Sims justified his 
bearing of guns by highlighting his military service, Voters League president A.Z. Young 
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defended his support for the Deacons with the remark, “I put in 168 days of straight combat 
in Europe in World War II when I was a platoon sergeant in a tank outfit. The way things are 
now, things are about as bad as they were then.”82 In this statement to States-Item reporter 
Bill Crider, Young implicitly argued that the current nonviolent approach would not result in 
a changed situation. This anxiety was acknowledged in “The Jackie Robinson Column” 
distributed by the Associated Negro Press International—New York. Jackie Robinson, the 
famed professional baseball player who integrated Major League Baseball, remarked in his 
column that “Time and again, we have warned that if the United States Government and the 
Justice Department could not find some way…to arrest the insane and brutal beatings, 
killings, church and home bombings…the Negro would finally say: ‘scuse me, Dr. King’ and 
stand up and fight back.”83 These justifications for the Deacons cast self-defense as a 
necessary response to inaction by governmental bodies and the nonviolent approach at large.  
A Successful Movement: Consideration for Self-Defense 
The distinction between intimate participation in and detached observation of the 
South’s struggles accentuated as the Deacons became a prominent yet complicated topic of 
discussion and debate. In her piece “Visit Bogalusa and you will look for me,” Shana 
Alexander acknowledged this discrepancy when discussing her experience as an outsider 
engaging the Deacons in Bogalusa. Alexander wrote, “But [her interviews with ‘the warlike 
Deacon chieftain of Bogalusa’ and ‘a young white girl civil rights worker’] also reminded me 
that one’s feelings about violence are influenced more by geography and circumstance than 
by moral principle.”84 While those who actively participated in protest efforts in the South 
 
82 Pines, Murky Waters, 158.  
83 “Deacons Will Stay Unless U.S. Moves,” Pittsburg Courier, July 31, 1965, 10. 
84 Alexander, “Visit Bogalusa,” 28. 
 Streets 32 
often acknowledged the necessity of the Deacons (and protective services in general) for 
successful activism, those remaining outside of the South criticized self-defense through an 
inexperienced lens. Dedication to nonviolence was easy to proclaim, but reality oftentimes 
required a more direct counter to the threat and implementation of physical violence.  
James Meredith, who had been a strong opponent of self-defense and presumedly 
“violent” protest methods, realized the validity of being able to protect oneself. Following an 
attack by a white gunman during the Mississippi March Against Fear in 1966, Meredith told 
reporters “I’m sorry I didn’t have something to take care of that man.”85 Despite this incident 
of violence, CORE announced the continuation of the march under the protection of the 
Deacons. This decision, which was supported by Floyd McKissick and Martin Luther King, 
Jr., antagonized other leaders in the movement. On the other hand, Cleveland Sellers, who 
worked with SNCC, remarked that “[The Deacons] would tell us certain things we needed to 
know along the way. They would go into wooded areas. They would check cars out. They 
would keep their eyes on all of those things, but the spirit was around self-defense.”86 Martin 
Luther King, Jr., who had previously dismissed the Deacons as a threat to effective protest, 
recognized the value of self-defense in collaboration with nonviolence. Likewise, SNCC 
leader Stokely Carmichael recognized the significance of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
participation in the march. Just as the Deacons’ services would contribute to its success, 
King’s presence would undoubtedly bring national media attention. Such coverage inevitably 
revealed the congruence of self-defense by the Deacons and the nonviolent efforts espoused 
by Dr. King.  
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Although nonviolence served as effective sermon material, and undoubtedly 
contributed to the goal of racial equality, its success varied due to its inability to fully address 
violence by whites. Both sides of the debate on the value of self-defense, and specifically that 
practiced by the Deacons, were closely interconnected. In an article in the Los Angeles 
Times, CORE member Bayard Rustin dismissed all forms of violence in the movement: “I’m 
against the Klan doing it. I’m against the Minutemen doing it. I’m against the Negroes doing 
it—for any reason.”87 Meanwhile, CORE field worker Mike Lesser recognized the South’s 
reality of violence, remarking, “we are preaching non-violence, but [we] can only preach 
non-violence. We cannot tell someone not to defend his property and the lives of his family, 
and let me tell you, these 15-20 shotguns guarding our meetings are very reassuring.”88 The 
Deacons overcame and challenged the barriers of not being nonviolent through such 
validations of self-defense.     
Much, if not all of the debate surrounding the Deacons and the broader promotion of 
self-defense, was rooted in the maintenance of a successful civil rights movement. 
Organizations participating in the movement recognized the need for support from white 
Americans, and thus, they aimed to present themselves as flexible and peaceful partners 
rather than as forces of supposed society-altering change. In his article, Simon Wendt 
recalled this situation, writing, “[CORE’s] legitimacy as an acceptable civil rights 
organization as well as its financial wellbeing depended almost exclusively on white 
Northern liberals, who easily confused the acknowledged right of self-defense with the 
specter of ‘black violence’.”89 The growing acceptance of the Deacons’ protective services 
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by CORE field workers fueled questioning within the organization and in its larger bodies of 
support. Due to this pressure rooted in their association with the Deacons, CORE and its 
president, James Farmer, promoted the Deacons’ practice of self-defense as nonviolent in 
nature. During an appearance on the CBS broadcast Face the Nation, Farmer emphasized 
that the Deacons “used their weapons only in self-defense and accepted the nonviolent 
discipline during demonstrations.”90  
Among many activists within the movement, opposition or reluctance towards self-
defense was rooted in conflicted sentiments. For example, Ivory Perry recognized the value 
of the Deacons in ensuring the safety of nonviolent activists but remained firmly opposed to 
all forms of possible violence. He reflected that “I don’t even hate the Ku Klux Klan. I don’t 
like what they stand for, but to just come out and say I hate them and I wish all of them was 
dead, it just ain’t me.”91 Like Perry, other activists put their faith in nonviolence while also 
recognizing the significance of self-defense. Nonviolent protest was the principal goal, but 
people had the right to protect themselves. This acknowledgement alongside strong appeals 
for the end of self-defense efforts fueled and complicated analysis by the national media. 
Exaggeration and simplification resulted from the lack of a clear and widely-embraced 
position among activists. This ambiguous communication intensified as national attention 
focused on the Deacons.  
Varied interpretations of passive resistance resulted in the routine stimulation of 
debate on the effectiveness of nonviolence. As successful (and safe) protest became 
increasingly difficult, evidenced by the persistence of attacks by Bogalusa’s white 
supremacists, the Deacons’ services gained value with the civil rights movement. The 
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recognition of the validity of both nonviolence and self-defense resulted in the blurring of 
their distinctiveness. The reluctant, yet firm acceptance by nonviolent activists of the 
protection provided by self-defense activism affirmed the integrity of the Deacons. The 
shared accusation of Governor McKeithen’s ineptitude in providing aid strengthened the 
bond between the activist parties. As the utilization of guns remained a suspect method for 
some political leaders, such as McKeithen, the protection secured by their presence became 
increasingly evident. This reality translated into more intense support for the Deacons in the 
face of threats of arrest and legal punishment. 
Despite warnings reflective of generalizations and simplifications of Bogalusa’s 
racial reality, such as Governor McKeithen’s remark to the author of “Disarm Deacons, 
Others, Governor Tells Troopers” that “We’re going to run the Deacons out of business…,” 
the Deacons continued to successfully position themselves as necessary and appropriate 
factors in the fight for civil rights. The Deacons maintained a sincere—and thus 
compelling—voice in the media in spite of the governor’s brief and orchestrated engagement 
with “newsmen” to counter the supposed threats of resistance in Bogalusa. For example, the 
Deacons unwavering position on the best approach for civil rights success diverged from 
Governor McKeithen’s conflicting conclusions on the situation in Bogalusa. On the one 
hand, the governor called for peaceful interaction between whites and blacks and pleaded for 
the removal of all concealed guns. On the other hand, he recognized the persistence of 
opposition by the city’s white community and ordered this demographic to accept racial 
progress. Local blacks knew the improbability of such a change, which in turn invigorated 
their loyalty to resistance by force. While McKeithen traveled to Bogalusa with the goal of 
assisting in the establishment of order, he disregarded local black sentiment with his warning 
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to Charles Sims— “And I sent word if you were seen, to arrest you. You have been bragging 
you were going to kill people… I was going to arrest you on general principles. And I meant 
it.”92 In reality, Charles Sims’ supposed “bragging” acted to embolden the struggling black 
community during a time when the white community actively flaunted its ability to 
intimidate and control almost all facets of Bogalusa society.  
The Deacons’ Lasting Role in the Changing Racial Reality  
The Deacons received the majority of their media coverage in the span of a few 
months due to the escalation of tension and the resulting action in Bogalusa in the summer of 
1965. Informed and intimate analysis and interpretation of the group ensued as it made 
almost daily appearances on the national stage. The Deacons were featured alongside the 
larger situation in not only Bogalusa, but also the South in general. Thus, they were presented 
as both actors in and responders to the racial situation. The group successfully maintained its 
structure and spread its promotion of self-defense as resistance and activism in spite of the 
risk of the distortion of its principles and intentions. The group’s disregard for celebrity and 
widespread acceptance materialized through its frank interviews with national reporters.  
The Deacons aimed to justify their presence in the civil rights movement, which was 
welcomed by many people struggling against the racial status quo of the South. For example, 
in the “WATS Reports” for July 20, 1965, Mike Maller wrote, “Up in Morehead a Deacons 
for Defense has been organized. Most of the members are in their early 20’s. The men heard 
about the Deacons in Louisiana, and decided to form the group on their own.”93 Similarly, 
Reverend Edwin King of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party expressed his support 
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for the Deacons. He acknowledged the virtue of self-defense, remarking “when the organized 
government doesn’t protect the citizens, then maybe all the Deacons have done is to organize 
an honest police force….”94 Edwin King’s comparison of the Deacons to “Dr. King, people 
from SNCC, people from CORE, somebody from the NAACP,” alongside the remark that 
“We want people in Mississippi to know what Negroes are doing all over the United States” 
revealed the group’s success at promoting its position as nationally significant.95  
Although the Deacons’ presence in national publications waned as the situation in 
Bogalusa stabilized, the national attention on legal reprimands against Bogalusa’s white 
leaders and police force prompted further justification for self-defense activism. This 
disciplinary action, sanctioned by the federal government, began to materialize as early as 
July 1965 and continued through the early months of 1966. In his article “2 Bogalusa Aides 
Held in Contempt By Federal Court,” which was published on July 30, 1965, Reed reported 
that “Federal District Judge Herbert W. Christenberry held the two top police officials of 
Bogalusa in contempt of court…for failing to protect civil rights demonstrators from racist 
assailants.”96 The fact that Bogalusa’s presumed enforcers of protection and stability faced 
possible jail sentences for permitting violence revealed the harsh reality throughout much of 
the South. Demonstrators practicing nonviolence needed an alternative source of protection 
due to the consistent failure by the police to fulfill their role. Reed also highlighted the fact 
that Public Safety Commissioner Arnold D. Spiers and Police Chief Claxton Knight “must 
face a Federal Court jury trial in a criminal contempt proceeding.”97 The corruption in 
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Bogalusa was not the result of individual acts of malpractice, but rather representative of 
societal structure. This oppression was even more significant considering the extent of 
tension in Bogalusa. With the inclusion that “Gov. John J. McKeithen has had as many as 
380 of the state’s 584 state police officers in Bogalusa in recent weeks,” Reed emphasized 
the magnitude of this reality. 
Federal District Judge Christenberry aptly summarized the situation, observing that 
“Bogalusa’s troubles seemed to be caused by a small, hard core of white persons ‘who 
simply will not recognize that Washington Parish is part of the United States and that its 
inhabitants are subject to the laws of the United States’.”98 This group of resistant whites 
successfully maintained their reign of terror despite the abundance of police officers involved 
in Bogalusa. In his article, Gene Roberts discussed the likely impact of “sharp cutbacks…in 
the number of troopers on duty in this racially torn town.”99 The racial conflict stressed in “2 
Bogalusa Aides Held in Contempt By Federal Court” became increasingly unsolvable. 
During a march to the City Hall, civil rights activists had not encountered violence, but 
“bystanders [had] jeered, honked horns and waved Confederate flags.” The presence of a 
substantial police force successfully prevented violence, but the departure of state police 
officers meant an increasingly bleak future for Bogalusa’s civil rights efforts. While Roberts 
did not reference the Deacons, his conclusion on the future outlook of the Bogalusa situation 
implied the need for an alternative source of protection.   
Reed’s article “Judge Denounces Bogalusa Police: Sees ‘Deliberate Scheme’ to 
Harass and Beat Negroes,” published on December 30, 1965, provided an update on the legal 
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situation in Bogalusa. In the hearing for Chief Claxton Knight’s trial for civil contempt of 
court, “witnesses for the Negroes testified that the police snatched Negroes from cars, beat 
others in bars and clubbed many on the street….”100 Although there was no mention of the 
Deacons’ presence in Bogalusa, the inclusion of this testimony along with other examples of 
the injustices implemented and permitted by the police vindicated the Deacons’ self-defense 
activism. Many of the articles written during the summer of 1965 failed to highlight the 
extent of corruption by white officials in Bogalusa, and thus, the necessity of the Deacons 
was often considered dubious. Such clear descriptions of Bogalusa’s reality emphasized the 
fact that without acts of self-defense, local blacks and civil rights activists would have 
suffered from a consistently tumultuous situation.  
Although legal action progressed slowly, the enforcement and growing maintenance 
of the law prompted a significant shift in the behavior of not only Bogalusa’s population, but 
also many people throughout the South. The presence and success of the Justice Department 
in Bogalusa translated into both voluntary and begrudged pronouncements for structural and 
societal reform. Bogalusa mayor, Jesse Cutrer, responded to the Justice Department’s arrival 
by announcing on local radio stations that he supported “the [Voter League’s] right to march 
and picket” and called on civic and religious leaders to follow suit.101 Even Crown 
Zellerbach, which had served as a base for white supremacy for decades, began “negotiations 
with the Voters League to end segregation and discrimination” in its factory.102 The Bogalusa 
situation settled considerably as the summer of 1965 came to an end, with all sides—
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including members of the Ku Klux Klan, visiting civil rights activists, and the Deacons—
slowing down their activities. 
Along with its role in pressuring the “the city to repeal its segregation laws, 
desegregate public accommodations, and concede neighborhood improvements,” the 
Bogalusa civil rights movement, and specifically the Deacons for Defense and Justice, had 
inspired the vitalization of black identity.103 When reporting on the aftermath of these 
developments, Alan Katz spoke to one thirteen-year-old girl who remarked, “My folk used to 
be scared of the Ku Klux Klan. I’m not scared of them. I’m not afraid of anybody.”104 Reed’s 
article, “The Deacons, Too, Ride by Night,” emphasized the role of the Deacons in this 
community-wide transformation. Reed argued that the group’s services not only ensured that 
nonviolent activists, and more broadly, black community members and their white 
compatriots, could protest and live without fear of white backlash, but also affirmed their 
equality. This revelation and the subsequent embrace of a sense of self and purpose persisted 
after the easing of tension in Bogalusa.  
 The various media reports pertaining to the legal facets of the racial scene in 
Bogalusa unquestionably validated the Deacons. They were rarely referred to explicitly, but 
even this absence confirmed their success as an activist group. The Deacons promoted 
themselves as practitioners of localized self-defense and maintained a disregard for national 
glorification. The group achieved national prominence, but they engaged the spotlight solely 
to justify their efforts and promote the morality of self-defense. For the Deacons, and more 
broadly, Bogalusa’s black community, the injustices highlighted in the media were part of a 
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decades-long reality. Violence against blacks was not simply the result of the introduction of 
the civil rights movement.  
John Herbers’ piece “Ex-Klansman Tells of Flogging Youth,” published on January 
12, 1966, highlighted the deeply rooted prejudice against blacks. The titular ex-Klansman, 
John H. Gipson, explained to the House Committee on Un-American Activities how “he was 
initiated into a Klan ‘wrecking crew’ by anonymous masked men and how Klansmen 
planned and carried out a flogging and burning of churches.”105 Although these activities 
took place in neighboring Slidell, Louisiana, they reflected the situation in Bogalusa. Herbers 
remarked that “The Ku Klux Klan still controls Bogalusa, La., despite a Federal Court 
injunction, exposure of its membership and massive anti-Klan efforts by the Justice 
Department and civil rights groups” in an article published six days before the release of 
“Ex-Klansman.”106 This admittance of Bogalusa’s unresolved racial turmoil emphasized the 
dominance of white supremacy. The reality of injustice remained firmly in place despite the 
numerous civil rights victories in Bogalusa throughout the summer of 1965. National 
coverage on the continuation of discrimination and violence in Bogalusa either implicitly or 
explicitly related this state of affairs to the effectiveness of both law enforcement and activist 
efforts. Long-sought progress would ultimately be achieved in Bogalusa, largely as a result 
of the previously discussed introduction of the Justice Department. White supremacy’s 
durability when confronted with progress towards racial equality highlighted the unyielding 
reality that had defined Bogalusa throughout the previous decades. This exposé validated the 
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Deacons’ success in overcoming such seemingly permanent forces of obstruction while 
simultaneously elevating the notions of black pride and self-determined action.  
The revelation of white supremacy’s past domination of Bogalusa bolstered the 
Deacons’ lasting significance and allowed for increased acknowledgement of the struggles 
and subsequent actions of blacks—specifically those in the South. The Bogalusa chapter 
brought attention to a racial reality that had been shrouded by events in the broader civil 
rights movement by obtaining a national audience. In his coverage during the Mississippi 
March of Freedom in 1966, Paul Good recognized the failure of many reporters, writing that 
only a few acknowledged the black majority “whose atrophied political instincts were still 
held in check despite the Voting Rights Act, by threats of dispossession from the land, firing 
from job, or retaliation.”107 While attention focused on national movers in the civil rights 
movement often inspired positive reform, it inevitably led to frequent disengagement with 
the larger population actually experiencing injustice. The Deacons’ retainment of a localized 
identity throughout its interactions with national media reinforced the group’s status as a 
service for the people. Bogalusa’s discriminatory practices were largely structural and a part 
of daily life. Thus, reporting on the Deacons’ presence in Bogalusa emphasized the city’s 
authentic and localized struggle. Foundational and established institutions, such as Crown 
Zellerbach, employed black and white community members while simultaneously permitting 
the blossoming of racial tension. The Deacons confronted this complicated and intimate 
relationship, which expanded outside of the workspace and into the city’s streets and 
neighborhoods, and maintained its loyalty to the local black populace. The group remained 
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grounded in Bogalusa even after its services expanded elsewhere. While this association 
could have strained national interest for the Deacons, they successfully maneuvered this 
expansion.  
The Peculiar Success of the Deacons for Defense and Justice 
The Deacons for Defense and Justice were admittedly absent from many of the later 
analyses on the situation in Bogalusa, but this omission was not emblematic of their 
ineptitude or insignificance. The self-defense group had fulfilled its intentions of protecting 
both the local black community and the activists involved in Bogalusa. Although there 
remained a long battle against racial injustice in Bogalusa and the South at large, the Deacons 
had succeeded in maintaining their practice of self-defense activism and proven its 
effectiveness. The abundance of reports on the group throughout the summer of 1965—
which promoted its successes, questioned its methods and morals, and ultimately provided 
the Deacons with the means to advance their cause—served as evidence of their lasting 
significance in Bogalusa. Without the Deacons’ preservation of self-defense activism, the 
ability for CORE, the Civics and Voters League, and other civil rights entities to successfully 
practice nonviolent protest would have waned considerably. Likewise, the Deacons’ 
purposeful positioning on the national stage sparked debate on the validity of self-defense 
and nonviolent activism among both participants in the civil rights movement and the 
national populace. The Deacons were not conventional, nor did they promote themselves as 
such, and yet their engagement with national media provided them with an influential voice.  
The Deacons embodied the successful implementation of self-defense, and 
specifically that achieved with guns. Their simultaneous recognition of the value of 
nonviolence and the need for determined self-defense struck the core of the civil rights 
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movement. Despite the routine claim that guns were counterproductive to the movement, 
there was never “massive retaliation by local, state, and even federal authority” to their use 
by the Deacons within the law.108 In This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed, Cobb 
recognized this reality, writing, “There was no meaningful difference between white 
responses to armed resistance by blacks and white responses to nonviolent resistance by 
blacks.”109 The community-based approach of the Deacons helped instill an emboldened 
sense of pride in blacks throughout the nation. The group’s successful application of self-
defense reinvigorated the value of localized civil rights efforts, leading to increased success 
of and attention to the movement throughout the South. The Deacons believed themselves to 
be an honest and necessary force in the South despite the complicated nature of gun-use in 
activist efforts. As the concept of Black Power found support, which in turn led to an 
intensification of the movement’s presumedly “violent” faction, the Deacons maintained 
their distinctiveness. In response to the rise of Black Power, Charles Sims argued that “I 
don’t wanna live under Black Power. I don’t wanna live under white power. I want equal 
power, and that’s what I push.”110 The group’s intentions had always been to assist in the 
achievement of equality.  
The Deacons’ proclamation of self-defense in correspondence with nonviolence 
shunted widespread condemnation and invalidation. On the other hand, some activists, such 
as a growing number of southern CORE members, identified with the notion of black 
nationalism advancing throughout the nation—specifically in northern cities. For example, 
the Brooklyn chapter of CORE called for the endorsement of self-defense by the National 
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CORE leadership and “a representative of the Nation of Islam had been invited to speak” at 
the 1965 National CORE Convention.111 While the call for self-defense reflected the 
Deacons’ services, the rising chastisement of nonviolence marked a distinct shift in 
procedure. At the convention, Bogalusa Deacon representative Earnest Thomas recognized 
the growing estrangement with nonviolence and argued for a retainment of the traditionally 
accepted protest method. Charles Sims’ aforementioned disregard for “Black Power” in favor 
of “equal power” further reflected this awareness of the underlying implications of the 
dismissal of nonviolence. Success with self-defense, as experienced by the Deacons, largely 
coincided with responsible yet intentional exchange with national media. Contrarily, activists 
heralding the complete dismissal of the movement’s nonviolent standards faced reluctant and 
largely dismissive acceptance by the media and broader civil rights movement.  
Although the Deacons’ influence had largely waned by the time of SNCC leader 
Stokely Carmichael’s “Black Power” proclamation in 1966, the group’s embodiment of self-
defense increasingly exemplified a justifiable distinction within the broader civil rights arena. 
The Deacons inspired resistance by southern and northern whites, which in turn led to an 
intensification of conflict and debate, but the group also practiced within controlled limits. 
Coverage by The New York Times and accounts by visiting activists affirmed the Deacons’ 
positioning within the civil rights arena as a legitimate and appreciated force in spite of early 
reports of their militancy and threatening presence. The employment of the group’s services 
at the James Meredith March in June 1966 by nationally established promoters of 
nonviolence further validated the Deacons’ application of self-defense. The group’s 
recognition as justifiable practitioners of self-defense both created opportunities for further 
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self-characterization in the media and provided the Deacons with the resources to impact the 
movement.   
In contrast to the Deacons’ maintenance of respectability under an eye of 
multilayered speculation, CORE’s shift to more uncompromising efforts rooted in “Black 
Power,” which largely took shape after Bogalusa’s departure from the national stage, 
complicated the organization’s status within the movement and encouraged growing disdain 
by national media. Stokely Carmichael’s failure to position “Black Power” within the 
respected boundaries of the civil rights movement, evidenced by his acknowledgement that 
“whites get nervous when we don’t keep talking about brotherly love,” contrasted with the 
consistent insistence of the Deacons’ credibility as a beneficial service to the movement.112 
CORE’s national standing admittedly required a level of engagement exceeding that of the 
Deacons, as exemplified by the relative fading of the Bogalusa chapter as conditions in the 
city no longer captured national attention. The Deacons’ achievement of stabilized 
positioning elevated its impact onto the national stage even though it maintained a more 
localized structure and scale. They effectively preserved their identity in spite of the intensive 
analysis and scrutiny encouraged by national reception.  
Although the Deacons’ presence in the civil rights movement diminished as the 
situation in Bogalusa settled, their embodiment of self-defense rooted in the black 
community had a lasting impression on the movement and the nation at large. The 
ambiguities presented in the group’s engagement with national media, largely revolving 
around its composition and expansion, ensured the Deacons’ legacy. As Sims once remarked, 
“Anytime a Negro and a white man have any kind of round up and the Negro decide he going 
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to fight him back, he’s a Deacon.”113 The group’s mark persisted even after its departure 
from the national scene. The Deacons’ implementation of self-defense with guns highlighted 
the inequalities of the South and contributed to the development of black upliftment. The 
Deacons called out discrimination whenever their bearing of guns was threatened, citing 
Louisiana’s lax laws regarding guns. When reflecting on this situation, Sims stated, “We 
found out in Bogalusa that that law meant for the white man, it didn’t mean for the colored. 
Any time a colored man was caught with a weapon in his car, they jailed him for carrying a 
concealed weapon. So we carried them to court.”114 
The Deacons highlighted and confronted defining components of the South’s racial 
situation through their practice of self-defense. While the group ensured its legacy through 
localized efforts and engagements with the civil rights movement, it achieved the necessary 
credibility and authority through its exchange with national media. Under the national 
spotlight, the Deacons highlighted their surpassing of the respected norms of the civil rights 
movement. The Deacons were not the first nor the last example of self-defense, but they 
fueled a much-needed excitement in the civil rights movement. In his criticism of the 2003 
film Deacons for Defense, Christopher Strain affirmed the group’s legacy, writing, “Perhaps 
the film’s greatest shortcoming is that it sensationalizes a story that needs no aggrandizement 
from Hollywood….”115  
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